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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the relationship between social cognition and religious cognition. Many 
cognitive theories of religion claim that these two forms are somehow related, but the details are 
usually left unexplored and insights from theories of social cognition are not taken on board. I 
discuss the three main (groups of) theories of social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simu-
lation theory and enactivist theories. Secondly, I explore how these theories can help to enrich a 
number of cognitive theories of religion. The theories I discuss are Stewart Guthrie’s anthropo-
morphism, Justin Barrett’s hyperactive agency detection device, Jesse Bering’s existential theory 
of mind, Pascal Boyer’s minds with full strategic access and Tanya Luhrmann’s porous theory of 
mind. Finally, I look at how enrichment with insights from social cognition can help to combine 
different existing theories of religious cognition into a unified framework.
Key words: cognitive science of religion, social cognition, theory-theory, simulation theory, en-
activism
Słowa kluczowe: religioznawstwo kognitywne, poznanie społeczne, teoria teorii, teoria symulacji, 
enaktywizm
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I aim to examine the relationship between social and religious cognition 
as proposed in a number of cognitive theories of religion, and suggest prospects for 
how cognitive theories of religion can be enriched by insights from theories of social 
cognition. Many theories propose such a relationship, namely that supernatural beings 
are believed to have mental states or be minded like humans, but without discussing 
this in detail. Philosophical and psychological discussion about social cognition is 
much older and further developed than the cognitive theories of religion. It is there-
fore likely that including insights from theories on social cognition will be helpful and 
enriching. Although the literature on social cognition is vast, three main (groups of) 
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theories can be distinguished: the theory-theory, the simulation theory, and enactiv-
ist theories. For our purposes, the cognitive theories of religion that propose a link 
between social and religious cognition can also be divided into two groups: those 
that consider supernatural minds to be similar to human minds, and those which see 
supernatural minds as being (very) different. Since arguing for one theory of social or 
religious cognition would require one or many more other papers, I will only discuss 
the main theories in each field and see how cognitive theories of religion can be en-
riched by theories of social cognition. I will argue that enriching the existing cognitive 
theories can result in a more accurate account of religious cognition and can help in 
combining different existing theories into an overarching framework.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I introduce the cognitive theories 
of religion that propose a link between religious and social cognition. I also propose 
a distinction between two groups of theories as to whether they consider supernatu-
ral minds to be different from human minds or not. I have limited the discussion to 
the most influential theories in the field and to their main proponents. In Section 3, 
I discuss theories on social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory 
and enactivist theories. In the final section, I look at the question of which theory on 
social cognition fits best with which group of cognitive theories of religion, and see 
how the latter can be enriched by the former. I also make suggestions on how the 
enriched cognitive theories can be combined into one overarching framework.
2. Social cognition in cognitive science of religion
Many, if not most, cognitive theories of religion propose a link between religious cog-
nition and social cognition. By social cognition, I mean the mental abilities and pro-
cesses involved in gaining knowledge about other people’s mental states. According 
to many cognitive scientists, religious cognition is somehow similar to, or a subpart 
of, social cognition. Stewart Guthrie claims that religious beliefs arise when methods 
of inferring people’s mental states are applied to inanimate natural phenomena. For 
example, when people see clouds that resemble smiling faces, they will conclude to 
supernatural agency, just like they conclude to human agency when they see a smil-
ing human face.1 Justin Barrett argues for something similar when he claims that 
religious beliefs result from a hyperactive agency detection device. Because it was 
beneficial from an evolutionary perspective, the cognitive mechanism people use for 
detecting agents is prone to conclude to agency upon very limited evidence. As a re-
sult, natural phenomena like rustling of leaves or a stick that looks like a snake suffice 
to conclude to agency.2 Jesse Bering claims that religious beliefs result from attribut-
ing meaning to meaningless events whereby meaning is associated with intentional 
acts by a god.3 Pascal Boyer claims that the religious concepts people believe in are 
1 S. Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, New York–Oxford 1993.
2 J.L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, Oxford 2004.
3 J. Bering, “The Existential Theory of Mind”, Review of General Psychology, 2002, no. 6, pp. 3–24.
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always agents with a firm interest in moral behaviour. These agents are different from 
normal human agents because they have full access to people’s thoughts and desires.4 
Ara Norenzayan makes similar arguments.5 Tanya Luhrmann suggests that forming 
religious beliefs depends on a porous theory of mind by means of which religious 
people believe that God interacts with them by implanting thoughts.6
All these theories hold that gods, or other supernatural beings, are believed to 
be minded or have mental states. However, all also hold that religious cognition is 
to some extent different from ordinary social cognition. According to Guthrie’s and 
Barrett’s theories, supernatural minds are believed to be invisible. In both Boyer’s 
and Luhrmann’s theories, divine minds are believed to be more powerful than human 
minds. Therefore all theories seem to agree that religious cognition is a particular 
subclass of religious cognition, but the difference with ordinary cognition appears 
to be stronger in Boyer’s and Luhrmann’s theories. For Guthrie, Barrett and Bering, 
gods are invisible, but there is no real difference between human minds and the minds 
gods are believed to have. In Guthrie’s and Barrett’s theories, supernatural minds 
have the same agential powers as human minds, and in Bering’s theory both human 
and supernatural minds engage in intentional meaningful acts. According to Boyer, 
supernatural minds are clearly different since they have full access to people’s mental 
states whereas human minds do not, while Luhrmann’s argument suggests that su-
pernatural minds have the ability to intrude on other minds but human minds do not.
If religious cognition can be considered a subclass of social cognition, religious 
cognition is in many ways similar to social cognition. Theories of religious cogni-
tion could thus benefit from insights into social cognition. This is, however, largely 
missing in most theories of religion. In order to fill this lacuna, we will look at three 
influential approaches to social cognition in recent philosophy of mind.
3. Theories of social cognition
In this section, I will discuss three influential theories of social cognition: the 
theory -theory, the simulation theory and enactivist theories.7 I will lay out the the-
ories and discuss the empirical evidence that their proponents refer to. Arguing 
for one theory over another would require several other papers, so I will not take 
a stance on this issue.
4 P. Boyer, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts That Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors, 
London 2002, pp. 171–183.
5 A. Norenzayan, Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict, Princeton, NJ 
2013.
6 T.M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship 
with God, Vintage 2012.
7 I have omitted the older analogical theory (see A. Hyslop, Other Minds [in:] The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/
entries/other-minds/ [accessed: 24 June 2015]) because it has been largely abandoned. Some features of 
the analogical theory have been incorporated in the simulation theory. 
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Notable adherents of the theory-theory are Alison Gopnik and Peter Carruthers.8 
Carruthers defines his position as follows: “I believe that our understandings of men-
talistic notions – of belief, desire, perception, intention, and the rest – is largely given 
by the positions those notions occupy within a folk-psychological theory of the struc-
ture and functioning of the mind.”9 Gopnik illustrates what this folk-psychological 
theory amounts to by her metaphor of “the child as a scientist.”10 She writes, “Ac-
cording to this position, our everyday conception of the mind is an implicit naive the-
ory; children’s early conceptions of the mind are also implicit theories, and changes 
in those conceptions are theory changes. We refer to this explanatory position as the 
“theory-theory.”11 The children’s naive theory functions in the same way as a scien-
tific theory does for a scientist. Like scientific theories, the naive theory has content, 
namely ideas about other people’s mental states. On the basis of this content, children 
can make empirical predictions and these predictions are different from those of al-
ternative accounts. When the predictions turn out true, the child’s theory is corrobo-
rated, and when they turn out false, the theory is in need of revision. Gopnik adds that 
this naive theory need not be explicitly formulated.12
Now what is the content that forms the basis of children’s theories and predic-
tions? Carruthers writes, 
It is in virtue of knowing such things as: the relationship between line of vision, attention, and 
perception; between perception, background knowledge, and belief; between belief, desire, and 
intention; and between perception, intention, and action; that one is able to predict and explain 
the actions of others.13 
The main goal of naive theories is thus to explain the actions of others. Mental 
states are theoretical entities needed to do the explaining, much like the Higgs boson 
particle was needed to explain why some fundamental particles have mass. Both Car-
ruthers and Gopnik stress that naive theories are underdetermined by the evidence; 
the evidence does not clearly show what mental states best explain it. As a result, 
multiple conflicting naive theories can coexist as long as they are not ruled out by 
falsified predictions.
As evidence, advocates of the theory-theory often refer to the false belief test.14 In 
the original test, children under the age of 3 were introduced to a puppet who has 
a piece of chocolate and then hides it in a cupboard. The puppet leaves and a second 
puppet enters the scene. The second puppet hides the piece of chocolate in a box. When 
8 P. Carruthers, Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory-Theory [in:] Theories of Theo-
ries of Mind, P. Carruthers, P.K. Smith (eds.), Cambridge 1996; A. Gopnik, A.N Meltzoff, P.K. Kuhl, The 
Scientist in the Crib: What Early Learning Tells Us About the Mind, New York 2001.
9 P. Carruthers, Simulation and Self-Knowledge..., p. 22.
10 A. Gopnik, A.N Meltzoff, P.K. Kuhl, op.cit.
11 A. Gopnik, H.M Wellman, The Theory Theory [in:] Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in 
Cognition and Culture, L.A. Hirschfeld, S.A. Gelman (eds.), New York 1994, p. 257.
12 Ibidem.
13 P. Carruthers, Simulation and Self-Knowledge..., p. 24.
14 H. Wimmer, J. Perner, Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong 
Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception, “Cognition” 1983, vol. 13, pp. 103–128.
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the children are asked whether the first puppet knows that the piece of chocolate is now 
in the box, they usually answer yes. For proponents of the theory-theory, the false belief 
test shows that children’s theorising over other people’s minds is subject to revision as 
they grow older. Gopnik also claims that people use the same cognitive mechanisms for 
theorising over other people’s mental states as for scientific theory building.15
A second influential theory, the simulation theory, received its best-known de-
fence from Robert Gordon and Alvin Goldman. Advocates of the simulation theory 
object to the overly rational, or even cold, account of the theory-theory. Goldman 
writes, “People often say that they understand others by empathising with them, by 
putting themselves in others’ shoes.”16 Gordon writes: “The [simulation theory] im-
putes to us a hot methodology, which exploits one’s own motivational and emo-
tional resources and one’s own capacity for practical reasoning.”17 On the simulation 
theory, people arrive at beliefs about someone else’s mental states by transporting 
themselves in their imagination into the situation of that other person. For example, 
to form beliefs about someone else who is in love, a person will transport herself to 
the situation where she herself is in love and conclude from her own mental states 
what the other person’s mental states are.18 Simulation is thus process-driven rather 
than theory-driven.19 This process need not be conscious. As Goldman writes, “Men-
tal simulations might occur automatically, without intent, and then get used to form 
beliefs about mind-reading questions.”20
The simulation theory draws support from a tradition going back at least to David 
Hume, which stresses the importance of empathy and sympathy in judging others.21 
Apart from this common-sense defence, defenders of the simulation theory some-
times refer to mirror neurons as evidence for their theory. These neurons are believed 
to be a class of visuomotor neurons that respond both when a particular action is 
performed and when the same action is observed in another person.22 Neuroscientific 
research has, however, cast doubt on the existence of mirror neurons in humans.23
The last recent approach has its roots in enactivist theories of cognition.24 Enactiv-
ists object to the rationalism of traditional cognitive sciences and opt for an embod-
ied, narrative and enactive approach to human cognition instead. Shaun Gallagher 
15 A. Gopnik, A.N. Meltzoff, P.K. Kuhl, op.cit.
16 A. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, 
Oxford 2006, p. vii.
17 R.M. Gordon, Radical Simulationism [in:] Theories of Theories of Mind, P. Carruthers, P.K. Smith 
(eds.), Cambridge 1996, p. 11.
18 Ibidem.
19 A. Goldman, Interpretation Psychologized, “Mind and Language” 1989, vol. 4, pp. 161–185.
20 A. Goldman, Simulating Minds..., p. 40.
21 Ibidem, p. 17.
22 V. Gallese, A. Goldman, Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading, “Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences” 1998, vol. 2, pp. 493–501.
23 A. Lingnau, B. Gesierich, A. Caramazza, Asymmetric fMRI Adaptation Reveals No Evidence 
for Mirror Neurons in Humans, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences” 2009, vol. 106, 
pp. 9925–9930. 
24 E.g. S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, London 2012; D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, 
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content, Cambridge 2012.
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holds that “[...]primary intersubjectivity [...] is the primary way we continue to un-
derstand others in second-person interactions.”25 In his view, understanding other 
people’s mental states is neither theoretical nor based on simulation, but an embodied 
practice. He does not deny that theorising and simulation play some role in social 
cognition,26 but its role is very limited. These practices are emotional rather than 
rational, sensory-motor rather than cognitive, perceptual rather than theoretical, and 
nonconceptual. Gallagher also refers to these practices as “interpersonal pragmatics”. 
The practices lead to a direct, pragmatic understanding of another person’s mental 
states. According to Daniel Hutto, understanding other people’s mental states can-
not happen outside of narratives. He notes that “[...] by far the best and most reliable 
means of obtaining a true understanding of why another has acted is to get the rel-
evant story directly from the horse’s mouth.”27 He further claims that folk-psycho-
logical narratives do a lot of work in making sense of other people’s mental states.28 
All three theories of social cognition appear to be (very) different, with the theory-
theory taking a theoretical approach, the simulation theory taking a softer, more em-
pathic approach and enactivist theories taking an embodied approach. Hybrid theo-
ries have been suggested, but they are rather rare.
4. Religious cognition as social cognition
In this section I will work towards an integrative framework for understanding reli-
gious cognition as social cognition. As we saw in the second section, cognitive scien-
tists of religion tend to consider religious cognition as a particular subclass of social 
cognition. We also noted that some cognitive scientists see supernatural minds as 
rather similar to human minds, while others see supernatural minds as (very) differ-
ent. The distinction is important because both groups of theories appear to fit better 
with various theories of social cognition.
4.1. Religious cognition as situated social cognition
In the theories of Guthrie, Barrett and Bering, gods are believed to be invisible, but 
their minds not to differ from human minds. Stewart Guthrie starts from the obser-
vation that humans tend to look at the world in an animistic fashion, meaning that 
they often see non-living things as alive; for example boulders as bears and flying 
pieces of paper as birds. Humans also do something more – they anthropomorphise; 
when humans see patterns like faces in clouds or thunderstorms, they will see it 
as intentionally created. Guthrie does not claim that humans see intentional action 
everywhere, but does hold that in situations where uncertainty and stakes are high, 
25 S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind..., p. 83.
26 This remark by Gallagher is quite remarkable since few theorists in social cognition have com-
bined the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Usually the two theories are contra posted. 
27 D.D. Hutto, The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology 
[in:] Narrative and Understanding Persons, D.D. Hutto (ed.), Cambridge 2007, p. 46.
28 Ibidem.
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they usually will. According to Guthrie, this tendency results from our evolutionary 
history. For our ancestors, it was much safer to attribute most patterns to intentional 
actions because not doing so could result in a failure to note a predator or potential 
enemy. Guthrie adds that all of this usually remains unconscious.29
According to Justin Barrett, religious cognition results from hyperactivity of the 
“agency detection device” (ADD). Because it is hyperactive, the ADD is prone to 
find agents even on very modest evidence of their presence, and the detected agents 
are sometimes believed to be supernatural. Humans constantly scan their environ-
ments for the presence of other agents, and ambiguous evidence, like rustling leaves 
or wispy forms, will usually be interpreted as stemming from the behaviour of an 
agent. Barrett argues that this process may contribute to the formation of religious 
concepts in two ways. First, ADD can identify an ambiguous thing itself as an in-
tentional agent. Examples are interpreting fog or clouds as ghosts or spirits. Sec-
ond, ADD can interpret ambiguous evidence (noises, natural phenomena) as result-
ing from agency without finding a physical, visible agent responsible for it. The 
ADD may then conclude that the observed phenomena are caused by an invisible 
agent. Barrett uses similar evolutionary foundations to Guthrie; claiming that it was 
safer for our ancestors to detect too many agents than too few, because detecting one 
predator too few could result in death, whereas detecting too many predators would 
not. Like Guthrie, Barrett does not claim that this whole process is always conscious.30
Jesse Bering developed the most explicit social account of religious cognition. 
He explicitly connects religious cognition to the theory of mind (ToM), which is the 
cognitive system responsible for human social cognition. Bering writes that, 
The presence of an existential theory of mind (EToM) suggests that individuals perceive some 
nondescript or culturally elaborated (e.g. God) psychological agency as having encoded com-
municative intentions in the form of life events, similar to a person encoding communicative 
intentions in deictic gestures.31
He suggests that the EToM is a special function of the ToM responsible for per-
ceiving meaning in certain live events. Events that are perceived as meaningful are 
intuitively connected with intentionality since only minded beings are believed to be 
able to give meaning. Upon perceiving meaningful events where no apparent mean-
ing giver is to be found, people will be inclined to infer to an ultimate meaning giver 
or God, claims Bering. He does not take a stance on whether this whole process takes 
place consciously or not. 
Although simulation is not immediately ruled out, none of the three accounts 
suggest that beliefs about supernatural minds result from simulation processes. The 
accounts do fit well with a theory-theory approach. On all three accounts, beliefs 
about supernatural minds can be said to explain certain phenomena. In Guthrie’s 
view, supernatural minds explain patterns in nature; in Barrett’s, they explain al-
legedly agential phenomena; according to Bering, they explain the occurrence of 
29 S. Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds..., pp. 39–61.
30 J.L. Barrett, op.cit., pp. 31–44.
31 J. Bering, The Existential Theory of Mind, “Review of General Psychology” 2002, no. 6, pp. 3.
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meaningful events. However, none of the theories make any mention of empirical 
theory testing and theory revision. This might be because Guthrie, Barrett and Bering 
are primarily interested in the roots of religious cognition and not in their further de-
velopment. Obviously, religious beliefs move well beyond the beliefs Guthrie, Bar-
rett and Bering discuss. No religion merely believes in gods that cause patterns, cause 
agential phenomena or invest meaning in nature. Nonetheless, perceptions of design, 
reports about supernatural interventions and experiences of profoundly meaningful 
events do play an important role in many religions. It is not unlikely that the root 
beliefs Guthrie, Barrett and Bering discuss set off a process of theory testing and 
revision similar to the one proposed by Carruthers and Gopnik. 
4.2. Religious cognition as exceptional social cognition
Two influential cognitive theories hold that supernatural minds are very different 
from human minds. Pascal Boyer writes, 
[A]re [...] gods just like other people? Not really. There is one major difference, [...] we always 
assume that other people are agents with limited access to strategic information [...]. In inter-
action with supernatural agents, people presume that these agents have full access to strategic 
information.32 
Boyer defines strategic information as “the subset of all the information currently 
available (to a particular agent, about a particular situation) which activates the men-
tal systems that regulate social interaction.”33 Examples of strategic information are 
people’s intentions or desires. It is strategic because it has a bearing on how to inter-
act with somebody. Boyer notes that strategic information is much more important 
to humans than to any other species because humans rely on social interaction to 
a far greater extent. For our ancestors, who relied on social interaction to coordinate 
hunting and food gathering, strategic information was even a matter of life and death. 
Having limited access to other people’s strategic information thus made humans vul-
nerable – and continues to do so. Gods, on the other hand, are not believed to have 
these limitations. For them, other minds are fully transparent. Boyer argues that be-
lieving in (a) god(s) with full access of this kind caused people to be more inclined 
to follow social rules. Especially if the god(s) are believed to be morally concerned 
and will punish or reward people in accordance with their obedience to social rules, 
groups that believe gods are watching will coordinate their activities better and will 
be more successful.34 Similar views have been defended by Scott Atran,35 Ara Noren-
zayan36 and Todd Tremlin.37
32 P. Boyer, op.cit., p. 178 (italics in original text).
33 P. Boyer, op.cit., p. 173.
34 Ibidem, pp. 155–191.
35 S. Atran, In Gods We Trust, Oxford 2002.
36 A. Norenzayan, op.cit.
37 T. Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion, Oxford 2010.
309
We noted in Section 3.1 that Bering puts ToM at the root of both social and re-
ligious cognition. Tanya Luhrmann also focuses on ToM, but argues that it requires 
some modification for religious cognition. In normal situations, minds are believed 
to be strictly separated; people normally believe that no external thoughts can enter 
their own minds. According to Luhrmann, this changes in religious cognition. For 
religious cognition the ToM has to become “porous”, meaning open for intrusion by 
another (supernatural) mind. According to this view, supernatural minds are able to 
intrude on people’s minds, whereas ordinary human minds are not.38 Emma Cohen 
argued for something similar when she discussed how in some religions spirits are 
believed to enter people’s minds and influence their thoughts.39
Both these accounts do not fit well with simulation; arriving at beliefs about su-
pernatural minds that differ (greatly) from human minds seems impossible by simula-
tion, because using one’s own mind will not lead to conclusions about (very) different 
minds. They also do not fit as well with the theory-theory as with the previous group 
of theories. It seems strange that people would settle on a mind with full access to 
strategic information or with the ability to intrude other minds as a conclusion to ex-
plain some observed phenomena. They might conclude to supernatural minds of this 
sort on the basis of experiences, but even then it remains unclear what kind of experi-
ences these would have to be. Both accounts fit better with enactivist theories of so-
cial cognition. Both Boyer’s and Luhrmann’s ways of conceiving religious cognition 
can be understood as incarnated in embodied practices. By definition, social norms 
always function within a community, and cannot be detached from the concrete social 
corporation they intend to give direction to. This was not only the case for our cave-
man ancestors; today, for people who believe that a god is watching them, this belief 
manifests itself in their concrete daily activities. Similarly, Luhrmann discusses the 
porosity of religious minds in the context of American evangelical churches. She de-
scribes how for evangelical Christians the belief that God can implant thoughts is not 
an abstract idea, but becomes concrete during prayer and religious services40. The im-
portance of narrativity is less obvious in Boyer’s and Luhrmann’s theories. However, 
in many religious traditions beliefs about God’s moralising nature form an important 
part of religious stories. Luhrmann also discusses the role of testimonies in evangeli-
cal churches in teaching believers how to discern thoughts implanted by God.
4.3. Toward a unified account
Cognitive science of religion has been criticised for giving too restricted a view of 
religious cognition that does not match what religious believers actually believe.41 
38 T.M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back...
39 E. Cohen, The Mind Possessed: The Cognition of Spirit Possession in an Afro-Brazilian Religious 
Tradition, Oxford 2007.
40 T.M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship 
with God, New York 2012.
41 J. Jong, Ch. Kavanagh, A. Visala, Born Idolaters: The Limits of the Philosophical Implications of 
the Cognitive Science of Religion, “Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphiloso-
phie” 2015, no. 57, pp. 244–266.
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There have also been concerns that cognitive theories of religion neglected the im-
portance of culture.42 Enriching the theories with insights about social cognition 
shows how these problems can be overcome. 
At first glance, the theories of Guthrie, Barrett and Bering bear little resemblance 
to how believers in the major world religions of today perceive their gods, though 
Barrett’s theory does to some extent resemble animistic religions. By incorporating 
the theory-theory into the first group of cognitive theories, this difference can be 
bridged. The experiences that Guthrie, Barrett and Bering discuss can be consid-
ered as root experiences that first raise awareness of supernatural minds. Secondly, 
people form initial beliefs about these supernatural minds to explain their experienc-
es. Thirdly, the initial beliefs are revised when the circumstances make it necessary. 
Since these circumstances will likely be different in different cultures, the revised 
beliefs will probably also be (very) different from culture to culture. Thus the three 
theories can accommodate cultural differences while retaining their cognitive focus.
Matters are somewhat different for the second group of theories we discussed. 
Incorporating enactivist theories of social cognition does not allow culture to be seen 
as something that is added to root experiences, because cultural embodied practic-
es and cultural narratives play an indispensable part in the formation of religious 
beliefs. Without social corporation, belief in supernatural minds with full access to 
other minds will not emerge, and without prayers and religious services, neither will 
belief in a supernatural mind that can intrude human minds. A problem emerges; on 
this account, religious cognition depends on cultural practices and narratives (social 
cooperation while being watched by god for Boyer and religious services and prayer 
for Luhrmann), but the cultural practices and narratives themselves cannot be under-
stood apart from religious beliefs. As a result, this account is circular, and the origins 
of religious beliefs remains a complete mystery. 
This problem can be solved by combining the two groups of cognitive theories 
into one overarching framework. The first group can explain the root experiences that 
lie at the basis of religious cognition and explain how the initial beliefs can be revised 
when circumstances make this necessary. Over time, revisions of initial beliefs will 
result in cultural differences, and then cultural practices and narratives can influence 
religious cognition themselves. The first group can thus account for basic religious 
cognition, and the second group for advanced cultural religious cognition. Both are 
needed to give an adequate account of religious cognition.
42 Emma Cohen, Jonathan Lanman, Harvey Whitehouse and Robert McCauley address this point as 
one of the common criticisms against the cognitive science of religion under the heading “The CSR is 
too narrow,” but claim that taking regard of cultural variation falls beyond the scope of cognitive science 
of religion (E. Cohen, J.A Lanman, H. Whitehouse, R.N McCauley, Common Criticisms of the Cognitive 
Science of Religion – Answered, “Bulletin of the Council of Societies for the Study of Religion” 2008, 
vol. 37, no. 4, p. 114). 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examined how cognitive theories of religion that propose a relation-
ship between social and religious cognition can be enriched by insights from theories 
on social cognition. I argued that this is indeed the case. Cognitive theories that con-
sider supernatural minds to be similar to human minds can be enriched with insights 
from the theory-theory. The resulting theory holds that people have certain root expe-
riences that lie at the basis of initial religious beliefs. These initial beliefs act as a the-
ory which can be revised when the circumstances require it. Cognitive theories that 
consider supernatural minds to be (very) different from human minds can be enriched 
with insights from enactivist theories of social cognition. Religious cognition is thus 
understood as embedded within embodied, cultural practices and cultural narratives.
I have also argued that both groups of theories need not be in conflict but can be 
combined. The first group then explains basic religious cognition by accounting for 
its root experiences and initial cultural development. The second group can explain 
advanced religious cognition when culture has moved beyond the point where it in-
fluences how religious beliefs are formed. The combination provides a richer and 
more accurate account, because it explains how religions can differ and it does justice 
to the importance of culture for religion. 
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